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CONSTRUCTIVISM, EMBEDDED LIBERALISM
AND ANTI-DUMPING – CANADIAN PUBLIC
INTEREST INQUIRY AS CASE STUDY OF
EMBEDDED LIBERALISM
Wissam Aoun†
ABSTRACT: The majority of proposals for international anti-dumping reform focus almost
entirely on the relevant economic factors – consumer welfare losses and gains. Therefore,
almost all proposals come to the exact same conclusion; in light of the enormous welfare
losses suffered by domestic consumers, international anti-dumping law should be repealed in
its entirety, or at least replaced by some form of international competition law. However, this
analysis views the issue of anti-dumping law through the constructivist lens, and more
specifically, the embedded liberalism view of international trade law. From this perspective,
economics alone does not grasp the constitutive realities at play in anti-dumping law; domestic
perspectives of legitimacy and fairness shape the contours of international anti-dumping law
and these constitutive norms espouse a view that protectionism, in a variety of different shapes
and forms, is as much a part of international trade law as the traditional laissez-faire liberalist
approach. This article concludes that public interest inquiries, which form part of a small
number of countries’ anti-dumping laws, embrace the constitutive realities at play in antidumping law and provide an opportunity for development of legitimate international antidumping reform. This article examines the Canadian approach to public interest inquiry in
anti-dumping, including recent developments. This article concludes that the current Canadian
experience demonstrates that embracing a public interest inquiry as part of anti-dumping
reform may provide true hope for future development based on an embedded liberalism view
of international trade relations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Economics of Anti-dumping

The issue of anti-dumping has become one of the most prevalent research
topics for international economics and legal scholars today. This should not be
surprising given the ubiquitous nature that this trade remedy has developed.
Many articles and research papers detail the growing concerns over the pervasive
use of anti-dumping across the globe, by developed and developing countries
alike. 1 The majority of criticisms are directed towards the poor economic
foundation of anti-dumping; while often times referred to as a form of
‘international competition law’, anti-dumping bears little legal or economic
resemblance to domestic competition policies. 2 Competition law focuses on
‘predatory pricing’, the selling of goods below cost by a firm attempting to
monopolize a market. However, selling below cost is a common occurrence in
market economies, and cannot be considered predatory without the requisite
intent to unduly lessen competition. Indeed, economists have paid scant attention
to predatory pricing given the numerous other more effective and efficient
methods of monopolizing markets.3
However, anti-dumping treats all goods imported at a price lower than the
common selling price in the exporting country as being ‘dumped’, 4 and if
‘injury’5 to the importing market is proven, the margin between the two prices is
1

See for example Thomas J. Prusa, Anti-dumping: A Growing Problem in International
Trade, 28 THE WORLD ECON. 683 (2005) [hereinafter Prusa].
2
For an excellent discussion of the comparative economics of anti-dumping and
Canadian competition law, see William A. Kerr, Dumping: Trade Policy in Need of a
Theoretical Make Over, 54 CAN. J. AGRIC. ECON. 2006 at 11–31 [hereinafter Kerr].
3
Id. at 16-17, 24.
4
Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement), 1868 U.N.T.S. 201 [hereinafter ADA].
5
Id.
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accommodated for by an imposed dumping duty. 6 In many instances, it is
consumers and down-stream users who bear the burden of welfare losses by
paying higher prices for the goods in question. This also creates dead weight
costs to consumers who are required to subsidize the procedural mechanisms to
prevent anti-dumping while accumulating no welfare benefits in instances where
no anti-competitive behaviour is present.7 At least one study estimates that the
net losses in consumer welfare caused by the imposition of anti-dumping duties
in the United States and the E.U. may be as high as two to four billion dollars
USD annually.8
The economic statistics regarding the international proliferation of antidumping paint a harrowing picture; what was once a meagre tool for a handful of
‘traditional users’ 9 has become a widespread phenomenon embraced by
developed and developing countries alike. However, as Prusa indicates, “the
sharp increase in new users may understate how concentrated the use of [antidumping] was until recently.” 10 Not only has anti-dumping use become
dominated by the ‘new users’, the proliferation of the worldwide use of antidumping actions has been driven almost entirely by ‘new users’.11 Traditional
users may now account for less than half of global anti-dumping activity.12 New
users file anti-dumping cases approximately 15-20 times more frequently than
traditional users, 13 and countries such as India and Argentina display a filing
intensity in excess of 1000 times that of traditional users.14 Undoubtedly, global
anti-dumping activity is skewed between developed and developing countries,
6

Id.
Valerie Stevens, The Political Economy of Anti-Dumping in Canada: Section 45 of the
Special Import Measures Act, 64 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 1, 12-15 (2006) [hereinafter
Stevens].
8
Gunnar Niels & Adriaan ten Kate, Antidumping Policy in Developing Countries: Safety
Valve or Obstacle to Free Trade?, 22 EUR J. POL. ECON. 618, (2006) [hereinafter Niels & ten
Kate].
9
The ‘traditional users’ are Canada, the United States, the E.U., and Australia; according
to Prusa, supra note 1, at 688, until 1987, traditional users accounted for almost all
international antidumping activity, and in the period from 1980-1984, over ninety-seven
percent of all GATT disputes were filed by the traditional users.
10
Prusa, supra note 1, at 688.
11
Id. at 689. Prusa states that “without the proliferation of antidumping [(“AD”)] to
dozens of new countries, AD activity would have been fairly constant over the last 25 years.”
See also Mark Wu, Antidumping in Asia’s Emerging Giants, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 17-18, 22
(Winter 2012) [hereinafter Wu], detailing the staggering statistics regarding increase
antidumping activity by ‘new users’ compared to the traditional users.
12
Prusa, supra note 1, at 688.
13
Id. at 684, measured in comparison per U.S. dollar of imports.
14
Id. at 691, filing intensity is determined by calculating the number of cases per real
dollar of imports and normalizing the ‘intensity’ measure so that the intensity level of the
world’s most frequent AD user in 1980, the United States, is set to 100; therefore, filing
intensity gives both an indication of comparison between other countries’ anti-dumping
activity and that of the United States, as well as growth of anti-dumping activity since 1980. In
addition to filing intensity, Prusa indicates that India and Argentina are filing ten to twenty
times the frequency of the United States and the E.U.
7
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with poorer countries such as India, China, Argentina, and Mexico dominating
anti-dumping use.15
Behind the simple statistics regarding use and proliferation rests a plethora
of political and macroeconomic factors intertwined in the global anti-dumping
activity. At least one study indicates that in Mexico, the number of anti-dumping
complaints and the likelihood of an injury determination increase in proportion
with the appreciation of real exchange rates, widening of current account deficits,
or domestic manufacturing output slow down.16 Aggarwal states that for both
developed and developing countries, a variety of macroeconomic factors lead to
increases in anti-dumping activities. Pressures caused by adverse trade balance
increase the number of anti-dumping initiations in low and lower middle income
countries.17 Furthermore, 1% decline in tariff rates lead to an 8% increase in antidumping initiations in developing countries. 18 Finally, in all Organisation for
Economic Co-operation Development countries, a 1% decline in industrial
growth rate results in a 6-7% increase in number of anti-dumping initiations.19
Furthermore, there is substantial statistical evidence that ‘retaliation’ plays a
considerable role in anti-dumping activity.20 Research indicates that every one
percent point increase in anti-dumping cases reported against low and lower
middle-income results in a fourteen to sixteen percent increase in anti-dumping
initiations.21 While at least one study seems to indicate that there is no ‘NorthSouth’ divide in retaliation measures, 22 motivations for retaliation may differ
between the two groups. While traditional users are more likely to file against
new users in order to protect themselves from deflected trade,23 new users are
more likely to file against traditional users in order to protect themselves from
trade surges resulting from increased anti-dumping activity.24

15

Id. at 693; see also Niels & ten Kate, supra note 8, at 628.
Supra note 8, at 623.
17
Aradhna Aggarwal, Macro Economic Determinants of Antidumping: A Comparative
Analysis of Developed and Developing Countries, 32 WORLD DEV. 1043 (2004); note,
Aggarwal uses the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”)
criteria for country income classification.
18
Id.
19
Id.; see also Michael M. Knetter & Thomas J. Prusa, Macroeconomic Factors and
Antidumping Filings: evidence from four countries, 61 J. INT’L ECON 1 (2003).
20
See id. at 1048 for an excellent summary of research regarding the role that retaliation
plays in global anti-dumping activity.
21
Id. at 1052.
22
Niels & ten Kate, supra note 8, at 621; what this indicates is that developing countries
are not more or less likely to target developed countries, and vice versa.
23
Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Reynolds, The Spread of Antidumping Regimes and the
Role of Retaliation in Filings, 72 S. ECON. J. 877, 886-887 (2006); deflected trade occurs when
there has been significant anti-dumping activity in a particular industry elsewhere in the world,
resulting in increased trade in third world countries.
24
Id. at 887; see also Wu, supra note 11, at 37-40, wherein Wu elaborates on the
politicized nature of the Indian anti-dumping regime and its effect on how and when
antidumping cases are initiated.
16
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B. Specific Issues Surrounding International/Domestic Anti-dumping Law

Prusa enumerates the problematic factors involved in the application of antidumping law.25In addition to the ‘bad economics’ of anti-dumping, he addresses
certain contentious procedural factors as well. Primarily, the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) Anti-Dumping Agreement (“ADA”) leaves tremendous
discretion to domestic authorities in implementing anti-dumping laws.26 This has
led to international inconsistencies in the methods used to determine dumping,
domestic injury, and the imposition of duties. 27 This discretion appears
particularly egregious when viewed in light of the seemingly unreasonable
dumping duties imposed by countries with lax and non-transparent
administrative authorities. 28 Furthermore, anti-dumping is the best option for
industries seeking protection from foreign competition. Unlike the safeguard
methods allowed under WTO law, anti-dumping petitions can be filed by a single
interested party rather than the country as a whole, and duties are imposed
against a single exporting country rather than the erga omnes application of
safeguards.29 Moreover, while safeguards require the implementing country to
offer concessions to affected states, anti-dumping imposes no such obligation.30
C. The Language of ‘Unfairness’

Perhaps the central tenet of anti-dumping, which lays the foundation for its
perceived legitimacy despite the plethora of criticisms, is what Finger and Zlate
refer to as “the inflammatory rhetoric of foreign unfairness”.31 The Doha Round
reform proposals to the previously enumerated procedural infirmities of antidumping laws are what Finger and Zlate label as “thinking within the box.”32
Rule shuffling, which favours one country or another while still allowing the
foundation of the problem to remain intact, effectively stifles any possibility of
qualitative or quantitative progress towards reducing the spread of anti-dumping
usage.33
Claims of (un)fairness in international trade may provide the only legitimacy
for maintaining international anti-dumping laws. Ironically, in contemporary
international law, legitimacy is typically used as justification for acting outside
of the law, a ‘teleological suspension of the ethical,’34 in circumstances such as
humanitarian intervention. However, the perception of illegitimate or ‘unfair’
trade practices is used to warrant the imposition of anti-dumping laws and duties
25

Prusa, supra note 1.
Id. at 697.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 697, Niels & ten Kate, supra note 8, at 621-622.
29
Prusa, supra note 1, at 697.
30
Id.
31
J. Michael Finger & Andrei Zlate, Antidumping: Prospects for Discipline From the
Doha Negotiations, 6 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 531 (2005), at 543 [hereinafter Finger & Zlate].
32
Id. at 545.
33
Id.
34
SOREN KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING (1932).
26
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in instances where it appears there is no economic justification for such
regulation.
Thus, an analysis of the anti-dumping phenomenon must move beyond pure
economics and give greater consideration to the socio-economics of political
trends, norms, and constitutive realities. Indeed, many of the anti-dumping
reforms proposed by economists highlight the poor economics of anti-dumping,
and either ignore the realities behind claims of unfair trade or give them
insufficient weight. 35 While economists can afford themselves the comfort of
remaining within the confines of economic models, legal scholars must view the
reality of market transactions within the framework of political ideologies,
legality, and legitimacy.

II. CONSTRUCTIVISM AND EMBEDDED LIBERALISM
A. Constructivism

The analysis thus far has led to an apparent impasse, a deadlocked
dichotomy between economic theory and the practical effects of the perception
of (il)legitimacy. A second dichotomy, the division between international
harmonization of trade rules and domestic regulation, presents a similar
stalemate. The apparent conflict in anti-dumping is exacerbated by the fact that
aspects of each of these two dichotomies project upon one another. The
economics of anti-dumping and legitimacy are intertwined with the allocation of
regulative functions between domestic and international institutions.
International legal scholar Andrew T. F. Lang posits the existence of a tool
for untangling the cascading dichotomies defined above. Lang proposes a reexamination of the insightful work of renowned international academic, John
Gerard Ruggie. Specifically, Lang believes that constructivism, 36 a theory
enthusiastically put forward by Ruggie in the early 1980s, may act as a
‘vanishing mediator’ in the deadlock between domestic and international
institutional regulation, between domestic politics and international trade law,
and a perspective lens through which critics may reconceptualise and redefine
international law and economics.37
Constructivist theory rests on a fundamental premise, a basic tenet that
supports and animates all other assertions, a principle which Ruggie labelled an

35
See for example Kerr, supra note 2; throughout this analysis, the tone is one of
contempt for non-economic issues such as ‘fairness’, as if such factors are irrelevant to
considerations of consumer welfare or ‘harm’; see also Finger & Zlate, supra note 31; here,
although Finger and Zlate do provide many interesting and useful suggestions, they seem to
rule out any possibility of ‘piecemeal’ reform, labelling any such reforms as ‘thinking within
the box’, and as such, leading to no quantitative or qualitative change.
36
Andrew T. F. Lang, Reconstructing Embedded Liberalism: John Gerard Ruggie and
Constructivist Approaches to the Study of the International Trade Regime, 9 J. INTL ECON. L.
81 (2006) [hereinafter Lang].
37
Id. at 99, 105, 115-116.
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‘inter-subjective framework of meaning.’ 38 This framework consists of
‘constitutive rules’ 39 – sets of norms, beliefs, and intentions that define the
contours of the regulative space, or as Lang puts it, “the rules of the game.”40 The
concept of ‘inter-subjectivity’ relates to the ‘shared’ aspect of these beliefs –
“regimes consist of shared expectations (beliefs) about how actors will and
should behave in their [relations] with one another…expressing collective not
individual intentionality.” 41 Thus, ‘inter-subjectivity’ refers to the tapestry of
norms and beliefs that form the underlying fabric of international relations.
The most significant aspect of Ruggie’s ‘inter-subjective framework of
meaning’ is the determination that this framework precedes any form of
regulation, or, one may dare restate it as ‘legitimacy preceding legality’. Lang
states that the framework consists of “a set of collectively agreed answers to
questions about why the regime itself exists and what is its domain of operation,
about the kinds of roles that member states are expected to play, the objectives
they are expected to pursue, and so on.”42 Thus, Lang concisely summarizes by
stating that “[c]onstitutive rules are logically prior to regulative rules, because
they define the domain in which regulative rules take effect.”43
In the domestic context, one could analogize the interplay between
constructivism and legislation with the ‘incomplete contract theory’ of law and
its view of rules and standards.44 While both rules and standards are difficult to
define with precision, rules can be viewed as specific ‘laws’ that are defined with
precision in order to efficiently regulate frequent behaviour. 45 However, if
behaviour is relatively infrequent, efficiency concerns cannot justify the
imposition of specific rules, and standards more aptly govern a range of
conduct. 46 In a domestic common law system, as behaviour becomes more
frequent, standards are defined with greater precision through the process of
judicial interpretation and jurisprudence, and eventually, if need be, legislative
intervention can turn a standard into a rule.47 As such, standards precede rules,
and as standards develop over time, through activity, discussion and debate,
standards may eventually develop into rules through governmental or
institutional intervention.
38
John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded
Liberalism and the Post-war Economic Order, 36 INTL ORG. 379, 380 (1982) [hereinafter
Ruggie].
39
Lang, supra note 36, at 104.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 103.
42
Id. at 104.
43
Id.
44
Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 333
(1999).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Through this elaboration, the relative ambiguity between rules and standards can be
seen; it is difficult to define precisely when a standard becomes a rule considering that all
legislation at the domestic level is open to some interpretation. However, this framework does
provide a useful tool for the analysis of the relative efficiencies/inefficiencies of an institution.
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B. Embedded Liberalism

Applying his constructivist approach to the international trade regime,
Ruggie discerns an underlying constitutive norm present in international trade
since the post-WWII era, which he refers to as ‘embedded liberalism.’48 Opposed
to traditional liberalism, which emphasizes a laissez-faire approach to free
market transactions and relations, Ruggie identifies a common thread in
international trade since the inception of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (“GATT”) and the Bretton Woods institutions, what he describes as “a
fusion of power and legitimate social purpose.”49 Ruggie concludes that everchanging perceptions of ‘legitimate social purpose’ have, in large part, shaped
and determined the direction of the international economic order.50
Lang’s analysis of ‘embedded liberalism’ focuses on this conception of
‘legitimate social purpose’. Quoting Ruggie, Lang establishes the significance of
‘embedded liberalism’ in the debate regarding international/domestic trade
regulation, stating that “shared ideas at the international level…are in part a
function of changes in ideas at the domestic level. Particularly important, as far
as the international trade regime is concerned, are changes in ideas about the
purposes ‘in pursuit of which state power was expected to be employed in the
domestic economy.’”51 Tracing through the history of international trade, Ruggie
determines that purely economic conceptions of ‘neo-protectionism’ may not
necessarily run counter to the underlying intentions of the GATT/WTO. As
reflected in the initial GATT texts and throughout post-WWII trade practice, allout liberalization has not been the fundamental premise of multilateralism, but
rather, “multilateralism ultimately ‘meant non-discrimination above all.’”52
Thus, Lang’s contention is that the embedded liberalism framework creates
an imaginative space for international legal and economic scholars to “open our
eyes to important and under-explored dimensions of our subject of study and
provides a rigorous theoretical framework for their examination.”53 Lang surveys
the work of a number of proponents of embedded liberalism and demonstrates
how their work has assisted in reconceptualising and redefining such contentious
notions in international trade as ‘free trade’, ‘protectionism’, and ‘trade
intervention’ in light of the “ideational determinants” surrounding legitimate
social purposes.54 Most importantly, Lang concludes that embedded liberalism
reshapes our perceptions of the intentions of an international trade regime,
48

Ruggie, supra note 38.
Id. at 393.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 88; see also Reid M. Bolton, Anti-Dumping and Distrust: Reducing Anti-Dumping
Duties under the W.T.O. Through Heightened Scrutiny, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 66, 69 (2011)
[hereinafter Bolton] (“Although the ideal remedy would likely be a wholesale reform of the
Article or outright appeal, those avenues are foreclosed by the complete deadlock of every
round of trade negotiations over the last decade…”).
53
Lang, supra note 36, at 105; Lang emphasizes the particular importance of the
embedded liberalism framework in our current era of ‘trade and linkage’ debates.
54
Id. at 108, 113.
49
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especially the domestic/international dichotomy, stating that “[embedded
liberalism] offers a vision of the trade regime in which a commitment to social
protection was combined with, indeed inseparable from, efforts to liberalize
international trade…encourage[ing] us to base our thinking on an outdated and
impractical version of (say) the distinction between international and domestic
matters…encourage[ing] us to continue conceiving of distributive justice
concerns primarily within a single-nation optic, rather than on a broader
foundation.”55

III. THE CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE: ANTI-DUMPING, EMBEDDED
LIBERALISM, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
As the foregoing demonstrates, the international use of anti-dumping
remedies, despite constant criticism of its weak economic underpinning,
continues to proliferate with little in the way of reform. As such, Leclerc traces a
path through Canadian anti-dumping policy, pointing out that a Parliamentary
Sub-Committee review of the Special Import Measures Act (“SIMA”) conducted
in 1996 concluded that although repealing anti-dumping laws would be the ideal,
it is not realistic given other countries’ reluctance to embrace Canada’s
enthusiasm. 56 Canada is not the only country enthusiastic to see anti-dumping
disappear. Canada is only one of various other countries, including Australia,
that has expressed a desire to repeal anti-dumping law but does not believe that it
is feasible in the current international trade climate. 57 Despite this fact, after
many decades, the anti-dumping problem remains.
What the foregoing demonstrates is that the anti-dumping phenomenon is so
intertwined with the language of ‘(un)fairness’, with both petitioners and the
public alike relying on such notions to argue for and against anti-dumping
penalties. Constructivism, and specifically, the notion of embedded liberalism,
may provide a new lens with which to view this unique and enduring
phenomenon. While international law generally can be criticized as
overemphasizing the interests of certain stakeholders over others (i.e. capital
over labour, governments over domestic groups), 58 this imbalance is quite
possibly most prominent in the case of anti-dumping law. As one commentator
puts it, “while consumers may not be an insular minority in general, for the
purposes of anti-dumping law they have no voice in a broken political process.”59
It is this specific lack of a voice that contributes to the peculiar status quo of
anti-dumping, wherein no consensus seems to emerge regarding the constitutive
‘fairness’ of the trade remedy and no significant progress towards reform
develops. Alavi and Ahamat reference comments made by Janet Nuzum and
55

Id. at 97, 99.
Id. at 123.
57
Prusa, supra note 1.
58
See Sara Dillon, Opportunism and Trade Law Revisited: The Pseudo-Constitution of the
WTO, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1005, 1015 (2013).
59
Bolton, supra note 52, 88-89.
56
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David Rohr, former Commissioners of the International Trade Commission
(“ITC”), wherein Nuzum and Rohr state that anti-dumping is intended to protect
producers rather than consumers, and as such, we must expect some cost
accruing to consumers. 60 However, they question the validity of such an
assertion,61 and indeed, the fact that the debate surrounding the fairness of antidumping still rages on indicates that anti-dumping reform cannot ignore public
interest considerations.
As Zheng persuasively argues, it is this ‘democratic deficit’ which has led to
not only lack of reform in anti-dumping law, but more importantly, to a lack of
any clear consensus as to whether the maintenance of anti-dumping is, or is not,
desirable.62 To put it succinctly, the problem with anti-dumping is that we do not
fully understand what, from a constitutive sense, the problem actually is. The
danger, according to Zheng, is not that anti-dumping is protectionist, rather, it is
that it is the confusion and arbitrariness surrounding perceptions and application
of anti-dumping which are dangerous to overall trade policy.63 As Zheng states:
“one way for the two sides in the antidumping debate to engage each other
is for opponents of antidumping to step back and acknowledge the
potential value of antidumping as a safety valve, and for supporters of
antidumping to step back and acknowledge that antidumping may not be
the best safety valve available.”64

Zheng implicitly recognizes the constructivist issues at play in the antidumping ‘democratic deficit’, stating that “this democracy deficit in antidumping
hinders the process by which societal preferences on trade protectionism are
formed and has implications for the broader trade agenda.”65 As such, Zheng
advocates for the imposition of a mandatory public interest component in antidumping processes. The significance of this recommendation is that it embraces
the essential tension at the heart of the anti-dumping debate, bringing all
stakeholders into the discussion to move past the status quo debates surrounding
economic ‘(un)fairness’:
“By focusing on the “unfair” nature of the dumped imports, antidumping
allows domestic interest groups to appeal to the superficial righteousness
of protecting domestic producers from import competition and shields the
real questions about trade protectionism from being scrutinized and
debated in a meaningful manner… The question of what effect
antidumping has on consumers and downstream users also becomes much
less relevant when the overriding concern is about the “fairness” of the
60
Rokiah Alavi & Haniff Ahamat, Predation and Public Interest in the WTO AntiDumping Duty Determination: a Malaysian Case, 25 J. ECON. COOPERATION AMONG ISLAMIC
COUNTRIES 61, 61-81 (2004).
61
Id.
62
Wentong Zheng, Reforming Trade Remedies, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 151, 158 (2012).
63
Id.
64
Id. at 166
65
Id. at 176.
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imports. With this “unfair trade” rhetoric hijacking the antidumping
process, there are no honest debates on whether and at what costs the
importing country needs trade protection in the form of antidumping
duties.”66

Zheng identifies the political core at the centre of the anti-dumping debate, a
core that is far more complex than the typical language of ‘(un)fair’ trade. In
advocating for a mandatory public interesting inquiry, Zheng states that “the
public interest clause is intended to transform the trade remedy process from a
mechanical one based on formulas and number-crunching to a political one based
on bargaining and compromise.”67
Zheng is not alone in his identification of the need for greater public interest
involvement, and in recent years, an increasing number of scholars have
advocated for inclusion of a mandatory ‘public interest’ inquiry in anti-dumping
processes. 68 The growing number of voices moving past the ‘traditional’ fair
versus unfair debate reflects recognition of the complex domestic socioeconomic
forces animating international trade norms. Bi explicitly addresses this link,
calling for greater consumer participation in anti-dumping investigations by
incorporating ‘public interest’ determinations as a first step in the process. 69
Particularly, Bi traces the path from the development of domestic norms to the
international forum, stating that after incorporating a reform package including a
mandatory ‘public interest’ inquiry, “it might then be possible to bring the issue
of antidumping on the agenda of multilateral negotiations again.”70
The reality is that few jurisdictions provide public interest participatory
rights. “The [Anti-Dumping] Agreement does not include industrial users and
consumers in a compulsory list of interested parties; this issue is left to the
discretion of individual Members. In practice, the domestic laws of WTO
Members rarely specify the possibility for industrial users and consumers to
become an interested party.” 71 Viewing the anti-dumping dilemma from an
embedded liberalism perspective, the lack of domestic consumer voice in the
anti-dumping debate is a significant impediment to the development of a
constitutive international framework regarding what exactly anti-dumping should
look like. Acknowledging an embedded liberalism view of international trade
relations demands that we empower the public interest voice within the antidumping framework, to slowly move from respective domestic forums towards
international consensus on the constitutive dimension of anti-dumping. To
paraphrase Kotsiubska, inclusion of public interest consideration into anti66
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dumping processes in various countries will contribute to an overall better
understanding of the public interest issues relevant to all WTO Members.72

IV. CANADIAN ANTI-DUMPING LAW
A. The Canadian Perspective: Political-Economic Statistics Regarding Anti-dumping
and ‘Protectionism’

Canadian anti-dumping practice has improved tremendously over the last
three decades. Statistics indicate that Canadian anti-dumping filing intensity is
nearly one eighth what it was thirty years ago.73 Furthermore, Canada’s ‘new
user’ North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) partner, Mexico, has
surpassed Canada in anti-dumping activity over the last twenty-five years. 74
However, despite Canada’s tremendous progress in reducing anti-dumping
activity, it can still be considered one of the most active anti-dumping
proponents. As Bown points out, Canada is the best in a bad lot. Canada trailed
only the other traditional users, the United States, Australia, and the E.U., in the
number of anti-dumping investigations undertaken between 1981 and 2001, and
ranked as the seventh most active user during the 1995-2004 period.75
However, Bown indicates that raw statistics regarding ‘improvement’ in
Canadian anti-dumping practice disguise the nuances of the socio-political
realities surrounding Canadian anti-dumping practices. In particular, NAFTA
may have resulted in the emergence of latent forms of discrimination in
Canadian anti-dumping practices. Bown cites the disproportionately low
percentage of anti-dumping duties imposed on U.S. imports as compared to the
percentage of all imports coming into Canada, as indication of subtle
discriminatory practices pervasive throughout Canadian anti-dumping activity.76
While it is unlikely that Canadian authorities blatantly intend to discriminate
between U.S. and non-U.S. imports, Bown posits that the integration and
intertwining of the Canadian and U.S. economies resulting from NAFTA has
resulted in political/economic parties joining forces to defend their combined
interests, resulting in added pressure for protectionism through anti-dumping
activity.77
The Canadian context of latent discrimination in anti-dumping practice is
unsettling for two reasons. Primarily, while Canadian practice has been able to
discriminate in favour of U.S. imports, at least one study indicates that U.S. antidumping activity has not been equally as favourable towards Canadian exports to
72
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the United States. As Blonigen’s analysis indicates, NAFTA (and its Chapter 19
dispute settlement mechanism) has had little effect on U.S. anti-dumping activity
against its NAFTA partners. 78 The same also holds true for Mexican antidumping practice post-NAFTA. 79 These statistics lead to a second major
concern. With the growing proliferation of regional trade agreements (“RTAs”)
and free trade agreements (“FTAs”) across the world, the Canadian perspective
may be an indication of symptomatic forms of discrimination arising from a
scattered web of international trade agreements. To put it simply, even in the
absence of anti-dumping processes in their current form, the constitutive
‘protectionist’ tendencies may simply reconstitute themselves in new forms and
modalities. Without identifying the cause and nature of these constitutive
behaviours and providing a structured base of rules to address them, these
behaviours may result in discriminatory practices contrary to the spirit of the
WTO.
B. The Application of s. 45 – ‘Public Interest’

As one scholar has put it, “the presence of a public interest in Canada’s trade
legislation is unique among trading nations,”80 placing Canada among a handful
of countries including, for example, Brazil, Paraguay, Thailand, Malaysia, China,
and countries in the E.U. Canada’s public interest clause is found under section
45 of the SIMA, 81 the legislation governing Canadian anti-dumping law.
Furthermore, the Special Import Measures Regulations (“Regulations”)82 provide
additional guidance regarding the application of the public interest inquiry. In
practice, public interest is only taken into consideration following a positive
injury determination by the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (“CITT”),
thus making the process somewhat bifurcated. The Regulations provide a broad
definition of ‘interested parties’ for the purposes of a public interest hearing, and
interested parties may request standing within twenty-one days of the notice of
hearing. 83 Based on the submissions presented at the hearing, the CITT
recommends to the Minister whether anti-dumping duties should be reduced,
eliminated completely, or neither.84
Despite the accolades bestowed upon Canada for attempting to counter the
welfare reducing effects of anti-dumping with a public interest inquiry, the
reality is that the public interest test has historically been perceived as largely
ineffective. Between the early 1980s to the late 2000s, the CITT had conducted
only eleven public interest hearings, and of these, only four led to a finding that
78
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public interest had been detrimentally affected by the imposition of anti-dumping
duties. 85 Furthermore, the CITT had never removed the duty completely, but
rather had always recommended a tariff reduction.86
Stevens has conducted a comprehensive review of Canadian anti-dumping
jurisprudence, and specifically, public interest under the SIMA. 87 Stevens
indicates that the CITT’s claim in Fibreglass Pipe88 that “the primary object of
[the SIMA] is to protect Canadian producers from injury caused by dumped or
subsidized imports,” is the foundation of ‘producer bias’ in public interest cases,
causing the CITT to give little weight to evidence of drastic price increases and
anti-competitive after-effects of anti-dumping duties. 89 However, the main
concern arising from this predicament is the inconsistency with which the CITT
has applied the public interest test. The CITT has often applied a reasoning that
seems to run entirely counter to the proposition in Fibreglass Pipe, and as such,
has left interested parties under s. 45 with little guidance in preparing for public
interest hearings.90
Stevens points to the Grain Corn91 and Beer92 cases, the earliest positive s.
45 decisions, as examples of the counter-intuitive reasoning applied by the CITT
when considering public interest. In both cases, the CITT engaged in a balancing
of producer and public interests, considered entirely in terms of economic factors
such as price and market effects, in concluding that reductions in tariffs were
appropriate. This type of balancing of economic interests had been explicitly
rejected by the CITT in Fibreglass Pipe, and subsequent cases such as Caps,
Lids and Jars,93 and Flat Hot-Rolled Carbon.94
In two more relatively recent positive s. 45 decisions, Prepared Baby Food95
and Contrast Media,96 the CITT considered public health interests in addition to
the prevailing economic factors such as anti-competitive effects and supply
shortages. As Stevens indicates, the most concerning aspect about these
decisions is that a significant proportion of the evidence submitted to the CITT
regarding public health issues was largely anecdotal, with very little statistical
research to substantiate the claims.97 However, in Caps, Lids and Jars, despite
substantial evidence presented regarding public health issues, the CITT
disregarded this evidence as “insufficient to merit intervention.”98 The CITT, in
85
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Caps, Lids and Jars, defined the standard justifying intervention to protect public
interest as requiring “compelling or special” circumstances. In Grain Corn, the
CITT stated that public interest provisions should only be applied on an
“exceptional basis.” 99 However, in Prepared Baby Food, the standard was
defined as “sufficiently compelling.”100
Ciuriak summarizes the four main successful public interest cases before the
CITT, and the CITT’s reasoning for reducing duties, as follows:
“Beer: consumer benefits and increased competition in the like goods
industry;
Prepared baby food: income distribution and children’s health tempered by
communitarian concerns about the impact of elimination of tariffs on the
Canadian producer’s community;
Iodinated contrast media: healthcare externalities for patients and cost
implications for hospitals; and
Stainless steel wire: downstream industry competitiveness.”101

As Ciuriak points out, while the CITT to date has shed “some light on its
views as to what a public interest test is not, it is less helpful in identifying what
it is.”102 According to Ciuriak, when trying to reconcile the confused CITT line
of cases regarding ‘public interest’ and anti-dumping duties, “if one may be
permitted a generalization, the Tribunal sees the purpose of duties as being to
restore competition, albeit on a qualified, “fair” basis, not to eliminate it.” 103
Furthermore, he states that the only apparent common element, if any, in these
decisions is the lack of an alternative supply of goods where duties were
prohibitive:
“When duties have prohibitive effects on imports, the Tribunal tends to be
sympathetic towards redress. Accordingly, in terms of its statutory criteria,
limited availability of the subject goods for downstream users is clearly the
principal consideration for the Tribunal. In this regard, the Tribunal
considers the availability of domestic and alternative sources of import
supply and, as well, whether there is continued supply of the subject goods,
in particular from suppliers facing low margins of dumping or
subsidisation. If these conditions are met, it is unlikely that the other
factors listed in the regulations – e.g., impacts on competition in the market
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or on the competitive position of downstream users – will be judged to be
significantly impaired.”104

Furthermore, Ciuriak highlights the unfortunate fact that public interest
inquiries take place not only after the injury determination rather than as part of
it, but also only after the CITT decides that a public interest inquiry is
warranted. 105 He states that this raises serious transparency issues, given the
appearance that “the real public interest test is conducted by the Tribunal prior to
the full investigation; the full investigation is primarily, it would appear, to
validate the internal review and to determine the extent to which duties should be
lowered.”106
Some could characterize the history of ‘public interest’ practice in Canadian
anti-dumping law as a case study in disappointment and missed opportunity.
However, these conclusions depend entirely on the perspective from which one
views the situation, especially considering recent developments. Specifically, the
recent Concrete Reinforcing Bar 107 CITT decision, followed by the Gypsum
Board Reference108 demonstrate a genesis in public interest participation in antidumping processes that is unique to global anti-dumping practice.
The anti-dumping inquiry was initiated by several manufacturers of steel
products, including ArcelorMittal Long Products Canada, AltaSteel Ltd., and
Gerdau Ameristeel Corporation. The mobilization of parties, both in favour of
and opposed to, reduction or elimination of duties was substantial and diverse in
the history of Canadian public interest inquiries. Twenty-eight parties
participated in the inquiry, including local governments (provincial and
municipal), foreign governments, various unions, trade associations, and
professional associations.109
In a tip of the hat to what Stevens called the ‘producer bias’ inherent in
Canada’s public interest inquiry, the CITT stated that it “considers it established
that the imposition of duties following an inquiry under section 42 of SIMA is in
the public interest”110 and that the purpose of the (apparently redundantly named)
‘public interest’ inquiry “is to determine whether the duties have unintended
consequences such that it would be in the public interest to consider their
elimination or reduction. If such is the case, the Tribunal will need to assess
whether and in what way these public interest concerns can be mitigated.”111
The CITT set out a list of unintended consequences for which a reduction or
elimination of duties would be justified. 112 This list contained a number of
‘qualifying’ terms, including “undue reduction of competition in the domestic
104
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market, which might lead to unnecessarily high prices”, “unacceptable reduction
in choice, quality or quantity of product for consumers,” “significant damage to
downstream users,” and “damage to some aspect of society considered to have an
overwhelming priority, such as health, safety, education, or public or national
security” (emphasis added). 113 Unfortunately, the CITT did not provide much
guidance regarding the interpretation of these terms so as to provide meaningful
guidance. Ultimately, the CITT rejected the arguments put forth by the three
overarching public interest groups representing downstream users of rebar
(fabricators and developers), purchasers of condominium units, and the B.C.
government and taxpayers bearing the costs of public infrastructure:
“In the Tribunal’s view, the current global picture of the B.C. rebar market
appears to reflect a competitive market for fairly traded rebar, with
multiple sources of supply and prices that respond to supply and demand,
as well as factors such as fluctuations in the price of scrap and the strength
of the Canadian dollar. The duties thus seem to have had their intended
consequences of neutralizing the effects of unfair trade practices while
allowing market forces to generate a new competitive environment for
fairly traded goods.”114
“[N]o persuasive evidence has been adduced in this case to show that such
effects represent anything more than the normal and intended
consequences of the application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties
or to show that any difficulties faced by fabricators cannot be overcome.
On the contrary, the evidence indicates that fabricators currently have
access to low world rebar prices from multiple sources which, in the
Tribunal’s view, will allow them to continue to compete for business in the
admittedly highly competitive rebar fabrication market in British
Columbia, notwithstanding any changes in their operations that may be
necessary as a result of the new market conditions.”115

The CITT highlighted the availability of potential supplies from foreign
sources, including from suppliers in Japan and Hong Kong, as a key mitigating
factor against the reduction of anti-dumping duties.116 With respect to real estate
pricing, the CITT stated that real estate pricing is driven “by other, far more
significant factors” than subject goods, rejecting the notion that reduction or
elimination of duties would have a significant effect on real estate prices.117
Shortly after this ruling was released, many of the same initiating parties in
the Concrete Reinforcing Bar case, including ArcelorMittal Long Products
Canada, AltaSteel Ltd., and Gerdau Ameristeel Corporation filed an antidumping complaint against rebar imported from countries including Chinese
113
114
115
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Taipei, Hong Kong, and Japan.118 These countries comprise many of the same
countries cited by the CITT in Concrete Reinforcing Bar as alternative suppliers
of rebar. This behaviour calls into question the (un)competitive strategy of the
domestic manufacturers. There has been substantial public backlash from both
the decision in Concrete Reinforcing Bar as well as subsequent conduct of the
initiating parties. 119 These individuals have expressed dissatisfaction not only
with anti-dumping law generally, but their perception of Canada’s seemingly
flawed public interest inquiry.
All of the foregoing dissatisfaction has culminated in the recent Gypsum
Board Reference. The Gypsum Board Reference is unique not only to Canadian
public interest processes, but to international anti-dumping generally. As one
commentator states with respect to the Gypsum Board Reference: “[t]his has
never happened before. This is very important. Trade lawyers outside Canada
(and inside Canada) will be shocked by the steps being taken in Canada during
an active anti-dumping proceeding.”120
In June of 2016, the Canada Border Services Agency (“CBSA”) initiated an
investigation following a complaint filed by CertainTeed Gypsum Canada Inc.
(“CTG”). In September of 2016, the CBSA finalized a preliminary determination
of dumping along with provisional anti-dumping duties ranging from 105% to
276.5%.121
It is at this point that the inquiry took an entirely unique turn. The Governor
in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Finance, directed the CITT
to inquire into “whether the imposition of provisional duties or duties, applicable
to gypsum board imported from the United States for markets in Western
Canada, is contrary to Canada’s economic, trade or commercial interests, and
specifically whether such an imposition has or would have the effect of
substantially reducing competition in this market or causing significant harm to
consumers of those goods or to businesses who use them.”122
The novelty of this inquiry lies in the fact that this was the first time in
Canadian history that the broader economic impact inquiry was conducted
simultaneously with the injury inquiry, rather than post-injury determination.123
Furthermore, the Gypsum Board Reference was conducted pursuant to Section 18
of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act, rather than the standard
118
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Section 45 inquiry pursuant to SIMA, which allows the Governor in Council to
refer to the CITT for inquiry or report “any matter in relation to the economic,
trade or commercial interests of Canada with respect to any goods or services”.
The Gypsum Board Reference is the first time such a reference has been
conducted in almost two decades and the first reference relating to an ongoing
anti-dumping proceeding.124
The CITT received a massive 108 notices of participation for the inquiry,
which included Canadian producers, unions, distributors, suppliers, home
builders and Members of Parliament.125 The CITT concluded that the imposition
of the proposed duties “will substantially reduce competition in Western Canada,
ha[ve] caused and will continue to cause significant harm to businesses who use
them, and harm consumers of those goods.126 The CITT based its conclusion on
several important findings. Primarily, the evidence suggested that the imposition
of duties would have the immediate effect of turning Canadian consumers away
from imported product towards the domestic producer, CTG. This was
problematic given the historical evidence of CTG’s inability to adequately
supply Western Canada with product. 127 The imposition of duties limited the
availability of imported supply of product to Western Canada, and a number of
other factors, including quality, and limited domestic purchasers’ ability to turn
to other imported sources.128 As such, the CITT concluded that “the imposition
of duties, in their full amount, in respect of imports of the subject goods will
have the effect of substantially reducing competition in the Western Canadian
market in the future, including losses in sources of supply, excessive price
increases and reduced consumer choice.”129
Interestingly, when assessing potential harm to Canadian consumers, the
CITT mimicked its traditional language in Section 45 inquiries, stating that
higher prices are a natural result of anti-dumping duties and as such, on a prima
facie basis, are in the public interest absent unintended or unwanted
consequences.130 The CITT concluded that the imposed duties would cause harm
to businesses who intend to use the product. 131 The CITT’s conclusion was
largely based on evidence of home builders and other construction contractors
entering into long-term agreements at pre-duty prices132; a rationale that seemed
to be given little weight by the CITT in the Concrete Reinforcing Bar decision.
Adding to the entirely unique nature of this Reference, the CITT specifically
pointed out the need to factor assistance for rebuilding Fort McMurray following
the devastating fire of May 2016, which destroyed approximately 1,600
124
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residential and non-residential structures.133 The CITT highlighted the relatively
large number of uninsured and under-insured home owners affected by the fire, a
number potentially as high as twenty percent of the total number of home
owners, and the effect that duties might have on these individuals during the
rebuilding process.134 Although not providing specific quantification of how this
disaster should tie into duty calculation, the CITT did emphasize that this reality
weighed into their overall consideration of the unintended consequences.
The CITT summarized its conclusion by stating that:
“the imposition of the provisional duties in this case led to unintended or
unwanted effects. The sudden increase in prices threw a market previously
characterized by relatively stable prices and predictable annual price
changes into disarray. This situation generated large unexpected losses for
downstream businesses using gypsum board, causing significant harm to
these industries. It has harmed consumers through unwanted increases of
overall construction and renovation costs for homes due to rising prices for
gypsum board. It will, in the future, result in a substantial reduction in
competition with several accompanying negative effects.”135

The CITT recommended that the provisional duties that had been collected
to date be retained by the Federal government and used to refund the higher costs
for imported and domestically produced gypsum board purchased since the
imposition of the provisional duties.136 Furthermore, the CITT recommended that
final duties on any cooperating exporters should not exceed forty-three percent of
the export price, a significant decrease from the originally proposed duties.137 At
the time of writing, the Minister of Finance had not yet released a statement as to
what would be done following receipt of the CITT’s recommendations.
C. The Constitutive Dimension of Canadian Anti-dumping Practice

Stevens offers a number of theories which she indicates may be used as an
‘interpretative tool’ with which to analyze the prevalence of producer bias in
public interest hearings. 138 These theories include the tariff-formation model,
which states that results of public interest hearings are influenced by the relative
turnout of interested parties (either producers or public interest groups),139 and
the political support theory, which states that the CITT is in a ‘political’ position,
weighing producer interests against general social welfare.140 Summarizing the
considerations involved in each of these theories, Stevens states that “the best
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interpretive tool is one that combines the political economy of the process with
the specific economic traits underlying each market system addressed.”141
The most insightful conclusion that Stevens draws from her interpretative
analysis is that the ‘free rider problem’ is perhaps the most significant issue
preventing greater consideration of the public interest in anti-dumping activity.
The welfare losses resulting from the imposition of duties is spread so thin across
the entire population that it is either unfeasible or unrealistic to expect public
interest to play a large enough role in anti-dumping inquiries in order to counter
the producer bias inherent in the process.142 Hence, in the Grain Corn and Beer
cases, it was large down-stream users, not general public interest groups acting
on behalf of consumers, which acted as interested parties in the hearings.
Furthermore, in Prepared Baby Food, the turnout of public interest groups was
possibly the largest mobilization of interested parties acting on behalf of direct
consumers in the history of Canadian anti-dumping law.
To put Stevens’ point succinctly, the reason public interest has not been a
more effective counter to producer bias in anti-dumping activity is because the
public is simply not interested, at least not as interested as producers who wield
the resources and power to put their interest into practice. Thus, at the domestic
level, the challenge lies in searching for ways to mobilize sufficient public
interest groups in order to counter the efforts of large producers.
Prior to Stevens, Leclerc had conducted a survey of CITT decisions in an
attempt to draw conclusions regarding possibilities for anti-dumping reform in
Canada.143 Similar to Stevens, Leclerc points to the CITT’s reasoning in cases
such as Fibreglass Pipe and Caps, Lids and Jars as creating a precedent which
does not allow balancing of consumer and producer interests. Instead, the CITT
must focus on dumping margins and injury and can only deviate when public
interest is “sufficiently compelling… to warrant a departure from the primary
object of SIMA.”144 Thus, Leclerc states that “SIMA seems to either assume that
harm to a domestic industry is in and of itself harmful to Canada’s overall
economic welfare, or treats Canada’s overall economic welfare as irrelevant to
the determination of harm.”145 Leclerc concludes that “a narrow interpretation of
the words ‘public interest’, combined with the strict standard of review that
would likely apply to decisions of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal, has
resulted in virtually meaningless public interest inquiries that rarely affect the
imposition of anti-dumping duties.”146
141
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Leclerc’s statement brings us full circle to the wager of embedded liberalism
– in international trade law more than simple economics is at stake. The paradox
that Leclerc perceives in the CITT’s application of Canadian anti-dumping law
results from an implicit assumption that anti-dumping law is purely economic in
nature. However, a broader perspective which embraces the constitutive realities
at play, both at the international level and at the Canadian domestic level, may
assist in uncovering a concealed image of anti-dumping law, one that combines
laissez-faire economics with various perceptions of legitimacy and social
purpose required to ‘embed liberalism’. Hence, concepts of ‘harm’ may
encompass different dimensions and perceptions beyond pure economic
indicators such as price increases and market distortions.
Leclerc implicitly realizes the reality of embedded liberalism in antidumping law when he states that “some kinds of government policy are not
based on economic concerns, but rather on shared concerns for social welfare…
on decidedly non-economic concerns like “nationhood”, “communitarianism”, or
“fairness”… [T]o confine an analysis of anti-dumping law to concerns of
economic efficiency alone would ignore these less tangible values… ”147 Ciuriak
also highlights the relative lack of consideration for non-economic
considerations, such as social, environmental, or political issues in the public
interest inquiry, and in this respect, focusing exclusively on economic factors
may bolster the compliance of Canada’s public interest inquiry with the WTO
Agreement.148 Despite this fact, Ciuriak states that some practitioners believe it is
necessary to bring non-economic social effects into the public interest inquiry in
order for it to be successful.149
What the years of confusion and disappointment have created is an
environment with no consensus on either the definite benefits or disadvantages of
anti-dumping law in its current form or the application of Canada’s public
interest inquiry. Recent cases have added layers of complexity; specifically, the
Concrete Reinforcing Bar and Gypsum Board Reference cases involved large
numbers of stakeholders, each group making a persuasive argument for the
advantages/disadvantages of anti-dumping duties in the specific context of each
case. Some might argue that this lack of consensus is the culmination of three
decades of misguided Canadian legislation.
Rather, the confusion itself, and the political processes it has unleashed, may
be sufficient justification in and of themselves. The attempt to create a public
interest space in Canada’s anti-dumping process, and the debate fomented there
within, is the solution. This conclusion may seem like a half-hearted attempt to
find some justification or meaning within decades of confused and unsatisfactory
public interest inquiry processes. The developments currently taking place in
Canada, which are unique not only to Canada but to global anti-dumping law
generally, have emerged within the public interest sphere in Canada’s antidumping forum; developments which are changing the norms of not only public
147
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interest inquiries but of anti-dumping law generally. These emerging norms are
manifesting themselves in new legal modalities that have the potential to
transcend the Canadian domestic sphere into the broader international trade
forum.
In this sense, despite the confusion and disappointment, Canada is still much
farther ahead than most nations with respect to developing legitimate norms
towards the potential of true reform. Novel transformations of anti-dumping
practice, processes, and perceptions have emerged from recent Canadian cases,
of which transformations are unique both domestically and internationally.
Perhaps continuing down the current path will materialize in a final, definitive
answer regarding the benefits and/or disadvantages of anti-dumping practice. Or,
the solution may be that there is no definitive answer and that anti-dumping law
is destined to remain politicized. Such a conclusion should not be viewed as a
failure. Perhaps the solution is to create a ‘political’ space, accessible through a
public inquiry mechanism, which functions based on a definitive set of
procedural rules capable of consistent, non-discriminatory application amongst
nations; rules viewed as being fair and legitimate.
The key lesson from recent Canadian public interest practice is that the
public interest space appears to provide a testing ground from which the
necessary conclusions can be derived. Imagine if a similar public interest inquiry
mechanism was available in jurisdictions around the world. Similar case studies
to those developed in Canada would create a body of evidence from which the
necessary conclusions can be drawn at the domestic level, extrapolated
internationally, and international rules could be developed.
The enduring nature of anti-dumping practice insinuates that at the heart of
this trade remedy lies a politicized core. To deny this would be naïve at best, and
willfully ignorant at worst. The embedded liberalism view takes this rationale
one step further, telling us that at the heart of international trade generally lies a
political core, a core around which compromise must be forged to secure the
international liberal trade order. Perhaps the persistence of the anti-dumping
remedy is testament to this fact, and that anti-dumping practice more than any
other area of international trade law necessitates the inclusion of a public interest
inquiry. What public interest processes, spread out across various jurisdictions
around the world, can teach us may be valuable not only for anti-dumping
reform, rather, the experiences gained may provide valuable lessons about the
liberalized international trade order generally.

V. EMBEDDED LIBERALISM AND POSSIBILITIES FOR REFORM
A. Canada and the International Forum

Canada’s efforts to reform anti-dumping practice, both domestically and
internationally, have been widely acknowledged. Renowned international
economist Aradhna Aggarwal has suggested a reform package for the WTO
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ADA that bears a striking resemblance to the SIMA and the Regulations. 150
Primarily, Aggarwal suggests that the WTO ADA be amended to include a
public interest clause, with enumerated factors for consideration similar to those
in the Regulations. 151 The ‘public interest’ test would mimic the ‘injury’ test
under the ADA, with a list of factors which every Member would be obligated to
consider when applying anti-dumping laws. This addition would add
tremendously to international harmonization of anti-dumping laws, and
ultimately bolster legitimacy. The WTO Appellate Body has previously stated
that of the fifteen factors enumerated under the ADA, ‘injury’ tests are
mandatory, in that Members must assess them in “an economically and factually
correct manner.”152 Thus, if the ADA incorporated a public inquiry test similar to
the injury test, Members would have recourse to the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body (“DSB”) to challenge other Members’ insufficient consideration of such
enumerated factors.
Despite the rejection of the addition of a public interest provision in the
ADA during the previous WTO Uruguay round, Canada submitted proposals for
such an addition during the Doha Round,153 demonstrating an ongoing desire to
keep this issue alive. Most notably, Canada submitted a proposal which suggests
bringing the ADA further into harmonization with the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures. 154 This proposal embodies the Canadian
constitutive position far greater than any other proposal. While Canada
recognizes the need for some protectionism under ‘legitimate’ circumstances,
continuing efforts should be made to refine and align perceptions of legitimacy
with objectively definable factors such as illegal subsidies under the Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
B. Canada and the Domestic Forum

The proposals for reform at the international level assist in defining the
Canadian constitutive position regarding legitimacy and anti-dumping. However,
an entirely ‘rules based’ approach, internationally governed through the WTO
institutional mechanism, causes a number of concerns. Primarily, how can civil
society, namely consumer groups, engage the WTO system in order to protect
their own interests? In the event that a Member state does not bring an action
against a state imposing anti-dumping duties against it, what recourse do such
150
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groups have available to them within the WTO system? Furthermore, even if a
Member state does bring an action against an imposing state, would such civil
groups present amicus briefs and submissions against their own home states?
Although it has seen considerable improvement, the WTO is still plagued by
institutional illegitimacy due to the inability to incorporate civil society groups
(such as Non-Governmental Organizations and other non-state actors) into the
DSB; the WTO DSB has either systematically disregarded the submissions of
civil society groups, or has only recognized them when joined with a
participating Member state’s submissions. 155 Several recent proposals provide
suggestions for greater consumer participation at the WTO, including the
possibility of government funding for consumer advocacy groups, which would
engage in public interest hearings on the behalf of consumers and other aspects
of under-represented civil society.
However, beyond the procedural institutional issues, this tension is
symptomatic of the inability of formal ‘rules based’ legitimacy to encompass and
provide a forum for the resolution of the substantive aspects of legitimacy
involved in anti-dumping regulation. These substantive issues cannot be defined
with sufficient precision to warrant specific rules for regulation. The concept of
‘fairness’ and the balancing of consumer and producer interests in light of the
‘harm’ caused by dumping are difficult to conceptualize, hence the frustration
expressed by numerous economists and legal scholars in the face of the everchanging perceptions of ‘fusion of power and legitimate social purpose’ involved
in anti-dumping regulation, to put it in Ruggie’s terms.
Therefore, much of the concern surrounding the substantive legitimacy
issues involved in anti-dumping regulation are better characterized as standards,
rather than rules, requiring gradual defining in order to achieve the precision
required for more formal rules for regulation. It is easy to forget that the more
formal regulative issues involved in anti-dumping (such as how to determine
what constitutes ‘injury’ or a ‘like product’ for anti-dumping purposes), as
embodied in the Canadian reform proposals, are concerns that have developed
over many years of global anti-dumping practice. These concerns have gradually
appeared in the international forum, changing the international constitutive
landscape to reflect the constitutive norms and beliefs emerging within domestic
populace. Even the current provisions of the ADA developed in the Uruguay
round as a reaction/reform to the prevalent concerns emerging from the previous
Kennedy round anti-dumping laws. These ‘standards based’ issues require the
appropriate domestic mechanisms in which to develop into constitutive norms
capable of developing into an international regulative framework. Thus, in the
quest for further anti-dumping reform, a space must remain open at the domestic
level for legitimacy concerns to continuously define, and redefine themselves.
To return to public interest analysis and critique, embedded liberalism,
driven through the public interest processes at the domestic level, provides civil
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society the space within which to voice its interest, and ultimately, to reshape the
international regulatory framework. In the context of anti-dumping, by engaging
the appropriate domestic mechanisms and exercising the right to voice their
concerns, civil society groups are able to reshape the constitutive rules. The
changing norms within one state influence other states in two ways; primarily,
the pressure placed on the state itself will require it to shift its stance towards
these same issues in the international forum, and second, civil society and public
interest groups in other states may adopt such methods to change the norms
within their own home states.
Thus, a piecemeal reform, similar to the approach taken by Canada over the
last three decades and within the Doha Round, is the key to opening antidumping up to the possibility of greater reform in the future. Primarily, the
Canadian position, as evidenced by the numerous proposals submitted to the
WTO during the current Doha round, seeks to create greater certainty and formal
legitimacy in the international application of anti-dumping laws, in an attempt to
create an international climate of non-discriminatory anti-dumping practices.
Second, Canada’s emphasis, both within its domestic laws and at the WTO, on
incorporating public interest into anti-dumping, creates the necessary opening for
substantive change and constitutive reform, thereby accepting the realistic
tensions between non-discrimination and protectionism, formal and substantive
justice, and the interaction between these issues and the ever-changing
constitutive norms which affect our perceptions of legitimacy.
At the domestic level, the challenge lies in empowering civil society in order
to exercise the voice of public interest. Finger and Zlate state that in order to
better incorporate the public interest into anti-dumping law:
“[r]eform depends also on the entrepreneurship of lobbyists/lawyers to
organize the users/consumers into an effective political force. There is an
untapped client base here, we are confident that as the number of trade
lawyers grows and competition for the presently recognized ‘interested
parties’ grows more intense, some among the new entrants into the trade
bar will recognize the business opportunity that adding users as interested
parties would provide, and will develop this market – as the present
generation of trade lawyers developed a market among protection users
and subsequently among foreign exporters. The remedy is more and
hungrier trade lawyers.”156

Returning to the Canadian example, in light of the apparent conflicting
interpretations which the CITT has given to s. 45 of the SIMA and the recent
developments stemming from Concrete Reinforcing Bar and Gypsum Board
Reference cases, it appears that more intelligent, creative, and determined
lawyers must be willing to engage this system in order to create the jurisprudence
necessary to give body to the constitutive norms which define the Canadian
‘public interest’. A larger body of jurisprudence provides guidance to future
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interested parties on how to conduct their legal actions accordingly. Similarly,
the process of judicial interpretation may lead to government intervention,
amendments to the current legislation, and possibly a shift in Canada’s position
at the international level. This same process, reproduced across jurisdictions
worldwide, would open a new international discussion on the constitutive norms
at play in international anti-dumping practice.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Viewed in light of the constructivist perspective on international law, and
more specifically, the embedded liberalism view of the international trade
regime, the current Canadian approach to international anti-dumping reform
appears to be the most coherent and realistic approach to this contentious issue in
international and Canadian domestic law. This piecemeal approach suggests that
the WTO ADA be reformed to provide greater formal legitimacy and certainty
by clarifying the procedures and analyses conducted within anti-dumping
practice, such as the application of ‘injury’, ‘like products’, and ‘public interest’
inquiries. This increased formal legitimacy will assist in promoting less
discrimination in international anti-dumping practice, bolstering a perception of
greater overall legitimacy.
More importantly, Canadian public interest experience demonstrates the
space created by domestic public interest processes is an essential opening for
development of international norms and further reform of anti-dumping law
generally. The public interest space allows domestic society to express its views
on the ever-changing perceptions of social purpose, fairness, and legitimacy,
thereby (re)shaping the constitutive norms that form the fabric of social
consciousness and applying pressure for changes at the international level. With
decades of debate regarding the appropriateness of anti-dumping law behind us,
perhaps the inclusion of public interest inquiries around the world will create a
new forum for a new discussion, and a better understanding of the complex
socioeconomic factors at play in global anti-dumping practice.
Given the dual aspect of this analysis focusing on the international/domestic
dichotomy, neither international anti-dumping law (specifically, the WTO ADA)
nor domestic jurisdictions outside of Canada were examined extensively. Future
research could examine each area in far greater detail. At the international level,
an analysis of the Canadian proposals for WTO ADA reform could be
undertaken to assess what impact prior WTO practice, both in the domestic
application of the ADA in various Member states and prior WTO DSB decisions,
would have on the future application of these reforms. At the Canadian domestic
level, a far more in-depth analysis of the possibilities of judicial review under s.
45 of the SIMA is definitely warranted, especially in light of the effects of
current jurisprudence and recent developments. Another interesting topic may be
an examination of what role, if any, the law of class actions can play in
protecting consumer interests in the context of anti-dumping law. Unfortunately,
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given the constraints of this article, these interesting topics fall outside the scope
of this analysis, but hopefully provide direction for future scholarship.

